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In this paper, we investigate the causal effects of public and private debts on US output
dynamics. We estimate a battery of Cointegrated Structural Vector Autoregressive models,
and we identify structural shocks by employing Independent Component Analysis, a
data-driven technique which avoids ad-hoc identification choices. The econometric results
suggest that the impact of debt on economic activity is Janus-faced. Public debt shocks
have positive and persistent influence on economic activity. In contrast, rising private debt
has a milder positive impact on gross domestic product, but it fades out over time. The
analysis of the possible transmission mechanisms reveals that public debt crowds in
private consumption and investment. In contrast, mortgage debt fuels consumption and
output in the short-run, but shrinks them in the medium-run.
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2 MATTIA GUERINI ET AL.
1. INTRODUCTION
This work empirically investigates the economic impact of private and public
debts, by employing a battery of Cointegrated Structural Vector Autoregressive
(SVAR) models, whose structural coefficients are identified employing a recently
developed data-driven methodology. Our goal is to contribute to the recent debate
about the role that different types of debt can have on economic dynamics.
The financial and economic crises of 2008 have intimately been intertwined
with the dynamics of debt.1 On the one hand, US firm and household debts have
been growing since the sixties until the outburst of the subprime real asset bubble
in 2008 (see also Figure 1, panels B and D). On the other hand, in the aftermath the
Great Recession, US public debt has skyrocketed from 60% to more than 100% of
gross domestic product (GDP) (see Figure 1, panel A), raising concerns about the
sustainability of public finances, and more generally, about the possible detrimental
effects of public debt on economic growth [Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)].
One of the most accepted narratives of the underlying causal mechanisms linking
public and private debts to real output dynamics dates back to the seminal work
of Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1986), and it has recently revived by a blossoming
number of contributions [from Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) and Bernanke et al.
(1999) all the way to Koo (2008), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010), Delli Gatti et al. (2010), Dosi et al. (2013, 2015), and the survey
in Brunnermeier et al. (2013)]. Buoyant credit fuels debt and asset prices bubbles,
which eventually get bust when a loss of confidence occurs. The consequent sharp
fall in asset prices considerably worsens the balance sheets of banks, freezing
interbank markets, and triggering credit rationing and flight to quality phenomena.
In turn, the fall in private consumption and investment paves the way to deflationary
pressures, which increase the real value of debt contracts and further worsen the
financial conditions of borrowers. In addition, default cascades and bank runs may
lead to the collapse of some financial institutions. Eventually, governments must
intervene by increasing deficit and public debt, possibly transforming a private
debt crisis in sovereign one.
In line with the previous theoretical developments, a wide consensus has
emerged at the empirical level about the detrimental effect of excessive credit
growth on economic dynamics [see in particular Mian and Sufi (2009, 2011),
Schularick and Taylor (2012), Jorda et al. (2013, 2016), Mian et al. (2017), Turner
(2017)]. These works provide robust evidence about the fact that high level of
households debt and upsurges in house prices have a great explanatory power for
the generation of financial crises.
On the contrary, the debate about the role of excessive public debt on macroe-
conomic dynamics is still open also due to scarcer available data. Empirical works
have tried to detect thresholds above which public debt becomes detrimental for
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FIGURE 1. Various measures of debt-to-GDP. The vertical dashed line represent 2007:Q4.
economic growth, and, more generally, to study the existence of a causal effects
between public debt and economic growth [see Checherita-Westphal and Rother
(2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Cecchetti et al.
(2011), Reinhart et al. (2012), Herndon et al. (2013), Panizza and Presbitero (2014),
Egert (2015), Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015)].2 These works typically employ
panel-data models and rely on annual observations from several countries. The
obtained mixed results suffer from different econometric problems. Apart from
the usual issue of endogeneity, another technical hurdle relates to the adoption of
panel-data regressions, which implicitly assumes that the causal effect of public
debt on economic growth is homogeneous in all the countries in the data set
(except for country-specific fixed effects). To our knowledge, the only exception
is the work by Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), who show the importance of
country heterogeneity employing kernel estimations.3 Finally, Jorda et al. (2014)
argue that expansionary fiscal policies lose their grip if the economy enters into a
financial crisis with an existing high level of public debt-to-GDP ratio.
In this work, we contribute to the aforementioned empirical research by jointly
investigating the impact of public and private debt on US GDP dynamics, employ-
ing a series of cointegrated SVAR models [Johansen (1995)]. Our work improves
upon the existing literature in several respects. First, the cointegrated SVAR ap-
proach is a way to tackle endogeneity, which has been one of the most delicate issue
in the literature about public and private debt so far, and to study the dynamics ef-
fects of debt on macroeconomic variables both in the short- and in the medium-run.
Second, we disentangle between different types of private debt (firm and household
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debt). Third, we investigate possible transmission mechanisms from private and
public debt to GDP, assessing the possible crowding-out or crowding-in effects
on consumption and investment. Finally, we identify structural relations by using
data-driven causal search algorithms [Independent Component Analysis (ICA)—
see Moneta et al. (2013), Gourieroux et al. (2017)]. The ICA procedure allows us
to identify structural private and public debt shocks by “letting the data speak,”
i.e., without resorting to any ad-hoc procedure grounded on economic theory.
We find that public debt shocks positively and persistently affect output. In that,
our results thus provide further evidence against the hypothesis that higher levels
of public debt hamper GDP growth [Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)]. In fact, surges
in public debt crowd-in private consumption and investment [Woodford (1990),
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Stiglitz (2012)], thus spurring output both in the
short- and in the medium-run. On the contrary, this does not appear to be the
case for private debt shocks. More specifically, we find that the positive effects of
private debt shocks are milder than public debt’s ones, and they fade out over time.
Moreover, increasing levels of mortgage debt have a negative impact on output
dynamics in the medium-run. Such a result appears to be consistent with the
hypothesis that mortgage debt inflates real asset bubbles, whose outburst triggers
financial crises [Mian and Sufi (2009)]. Finally, we find that the main econometric
results are robust to different model specifications and to the inclusions of the
Great Recession observations.
Our results suggest that debt is Janus-faced: different types of debt impact
differently on economic dynamics. In particular, possible menaces to medium-
and long-run output growth do not come from government debt, but rather from
increasing levels of private debt. In particular, surges in household debt appear to
be much more dangerous than increases in corporate debt.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe, respectively, the
estimation technique and the data. Sections 4 and 5 present the main results and
the robustness exercises. Section 6 concludes. Two appendices integrate the paper
with additional technical explanations.
2. METHODOLOGY
We estimate our multivariate time series model by means of a Cointegrated Vector
Autoregressive (CVAR) model in its transitory formulation, using the Johansen
(1995) procedure [see also Lu¨tkepohl (1991)]. Being Yt the k × 1 vector of
variables object of investigation, the model of interest is specified as:
Yt = Yt−1 + 1Yt−1 + · · · + p−1Yt−p+1 + ut, (1)
where  and i (i = 1, . . . , p − 1) are k × k matrices, and ut is a k × 1 vector
of error terms. Naturally, the model can also be rewritten in the more “standard”
VAR specification:
Yt = A1Yt−1 + · · · + ApYt−p + ut, (2)
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with i = −(Ai+1 + · · · + Ap), for i = 1, . . . ,p − 1 and  = αβt = −(I −
A1 − · · · − Ap). The matrix  represents the error correction term composed by
the loading matrix α and by the cointegration vector βt.
Estimation of the model in equation (1) is preferred since it allows the estimation
of the possible existing cointegrating relations, which are contained in βtYt−1,
coping with the possible common trends and with the nonstationarity that our
variables of interest might exhibit.
Both equations (1) and (2) are reduced-form models and share the same vector
of residuals ut. By rotating the reduced form models, premultiplying both sides of
the equation by a matrix 0, one can obtain the Structural-VAR (SVAR) model,
where structural shocks εt are meant to represent the “true” economic shocks
affecting the system:
0Yt = 1Yt−1 + · · · + pYt−p + εt, (3)
where i = 0Ai for i = 1, . . . ,p and εt = 0ut. However, even by assuming
orthogonal structural shocks, the identification problem requires k(k − 1)/2 re-
strictions on the matrix 0. Such restrictions are typically derived from economic
theory, and therefore additional assumptions and subjective choices are required.
The standard solution to this problem is the Cholesky decomposition, which
requires the assumptions of both contemporaneous acyclicity and specific causal
order, dictated by economic theory.
ICA allows us to relax the second assumption by recovering the matrix 0 with a
data-driven procedure [see Hyvarinen et al. (2010), Moneta et al. (2013), Gourier-
oux et al. (2017)].4 In this way, the causal order of the SVAR is not dictated by
debatable theoretical considerations, but one can achieve identification by letting
the data speak. More specifically, given ut = −10 εt, the ICA approach focuses
on the interpretation of the reduced form residuals ut as linear combinations of
the structural shocks εt , which have been combined by the mixing matrix −10 .
Under the assumptions that (i) ε1t , . . . , εkt are mutually independent (i.e., the joint
probability density function factorizes as f (ε1t , . . . , εkt ) = f (ε1t ) · . . . · f (εkt ));
and (ii) each shock ε1t , . . . , εkt is not normally distributed (with the exception of
at most one Gaussian shock), ICA is able to recover the matrix 0. The gist of
the ICA approach5 is to search among all the possible linear combinations of ut,
the one that minimizes their mutual statistical dependence, measured by mutual
information, defined as
I (x1t , . . . , xkt ) =
k∑
i=1
H(xit ) − H(xt ), (4)
where H is the differential entropy,6 and xt = (x1t , . . . , xkt )′ is a vector of
linear combinations of ut = (u1t , . . . , ukt )′. It turns out that the “directions” (i.e.,
transformations of the data) that minimizes mutual information can be found only
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if the data are non-Gaussian as Gaussian variables have the largest entropy among
all random variables of equal variance.7
Following Hyvarinen et al. (2010), we also assume that the VAR residuals ut
can be represented as a Linear Non-Gaussian Acyclic Model (LiNGAM), so that
the contemporaneous causal structure can be represented as a Directed Acyclic
Graph (DAG). This assumption allows us to apply a causal search algorithm,
such as the one presented in Appendix A [see Shimizu et al. (2006), Hyvarinen
et al. (2010), Moneta et al. (2013)], which allows us to achieve a data-driven
identification, directly comparable to a Cholesky decomposition, without any a
priori theoretical commitment.
After having identified and estimated the model in its structural form, in order to
analyze the effects that a shock to a debt variable has on GDP, we estimate Impulse
Response Functions (IRFs) with their bootstrapped confidence intervals, and we
formally test whether the effects are significantly different from zero. Following
Lu¨tkepohl (1991), the impulse response analysis in cointegrated systems can be
conducted in the same way as for stationary systems, hence no particular issue in
the estimation of IRF arises. In particular, to estimate the IRF of the model one
computes the vector moving average form of the model
Yt =
∞∑
s=0
sut−s, (5)
in which 0 = I and (for s = 1, 2 . . .), s =
∑s
j=1 Ajs−j (where Aj = 0 for
j > p). The impulse responses of the elements of Yt to the structural shocks
εt−s (s = 0, 1, 2, . . .) corresponds to the matrices s (s = 0, 1, 2, . . .) defined
as 0 = −10 and (for s = 1, 2, . . .) s =
∑s
j=1 Ajs−j. In the empirical results,
each IRF to the shock εtj is multiplied by the standard deviation of εtj , so that the
responses display the effect of a one-standard-deviation shock.
3. DATA
We employ US quarterly data drawn from the FRED (Federal Reserve
Economic Data) database, released by the Federal Reserve of St Louis
(https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/). We focus on the United States, because
our estimation and identification strategies require sufficiently long time series,
which, in the case of quarterly private and mortgage debt, are publicly available
only for this country. Our main sample ranges from the first quarter of 1966 to the
last quarter of 2015. The variables and their summary statistics are presented in
Table 1 and in Figure 2. Beyond GDP and different public and private debt series,
we have also included in our data set consumption, investment, government
expenditure, 3-months, and 10-years T-Bill rates to shed light on the possible
presence and direction of relevant transmission mechanisms. All the variables
have been downloaded in nominal terms and have been then deflated by means of
the GDP implicit price deflator (see last line of Table 1). However, to control for
possible biases introduced by the use of a common deflator for all the variables,
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TABLE 1. Data description
Label Variable description
Y Real gross domestic product
B Real federal debt: total public debt
L Real total credit to private nonfinancial sector
F Real nonfinancial corporate business debt securities
H Real mortgage debt outstanding
I Real gross fixed capital formation
C Real personal consumption expenditures
G Real government expenditures
R3m 3-month treasury bill: secondary market rate
R10y 10-year treasury bill: secondary market rate
P Gross domestic product: implicit price deflator, Index 2009 = 100
Note: The only two additional variables not inserted in the table, which have been adopted for the
robustness checks are the consumption-specific and the investment-specific deflators.
we have also performed some robustness check exercises adopting investment
and consumption specific deflators (see Table 3 for more details).
The cross-correlations between the log-differences of the variables (see
Figure 2) provide the first glimpse of the underlying relations. First, with the
exception of consumption, the correlations between public debt and all the other
variables are negative. Private debt instead, measured by the total amount of credit
to the private nonfinancial sector, is positively correlated with all the other variables
in the study. This also holds when we disaggregate the series into corporate and
household debts (the only exceptions are the correlations between corporate debt
and investment and interest rates.).
Before estimating a battery of CVAR models, we study the integration order of
the time series employing the Phillips and Perron (1988) test. We cannot reject
the null hypothesis (H0 = “Presence of unit root”) for all the variables in level
(see Table 2). On the contrary, the test rejects the null for all the variables in first
difference. This suggests that all the variables of interest have one unit root.
All the models in this work share the the reduced-form specification of
equation (1), estimated using the Johansen and Juselius (1990) maximum
likelihood procedure, which Silvapulle and Podivinsky (2000) demonstrate to be
reasonably robust under departures from normality. The vector-error correction
model specification allows us to exploit the information stemming from possible
cointegrating relationships.
4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
In this section, we employ a battery of CVAR models, identified according to the
data-driven ICA procedure, to investigate the effects of public and private debt on
the dynamics of output, consumption, and investment. The baseline specification
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TABLE 2. Phillips–Perron test for stationarity
Level Difference
Variable PP-test p-Value PP-test p-Value
Y −1.1056 0.9193 −10.2842 0.01
B −2.3184 0.4428 −9.3683 0.01
L −0.5299 0.9796 −8.4035 0.01
F −1.3161 0.8625 −8.8052 0.01
H −0.1825 0.9900 −4.0346 0.01
I −1.7969 0.6611 −8.0843 0.01
C −0.8974 0.9514 −10.4661 0.01
G −0.6104 0.9760 −11.9081 0.01
R3m −2.7281 0.2713 −11.0075 0.01
R10y −2.2819 0.4581 −10.9693 0.01
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FIGURE 2. Cross-correlations of the investigated stationarized variables.
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TABLE 3. CVAR model specifications
Cointegrarion Time
Model Variables Lag number (p) relations (r) period
1 Y, B, L, R3m AIC: 10, HQ: 6, BIC: 5 1 1966–2015
2 Y, B, L, I, R3m AIC: 10, HQ: 6, BIC: 1 2 1966–2015
3 Y, B, L, C, R3m AIC: 6, HQ: 5, BIC: 1 2 1966–2015
4 Y, B, F, I, R3m AIC: 8, HQ: 5, BIC: 2 2 1966–2015
5 Y, B, H, C, R3m AIC: 6, HQ: 4, BIC: 2 1 1966–2015
1nc Y, B, L, R3m AIC: 10, HQ: 5, BIC: 3 1 1966–2007
2df Y, B, L, I, R3m AIC: 10, HQ: 6, BIC: 1 1 1966–2015
3df Y, B, L, C, R3m AIC: 6, HQ: 5, BIC: 1 1 1966–2015
6 Y, B, L, R10y AIC: 9, HQ: 5, BIC: 3 1 1966–2015
7 Y, B, L, G, R10y AIC: 9, HQ: 5, BIC: 1 2 1966–2015
1r Y, B/Y, L/Y, R3m AIC: 10, HQ: 6, BIC: 5 1 1966–2015
8 Y, B, F, H, C, I, R3m AIC: 7, HQ: 2, BIC: 1 3 1966–2015
8r Y, B/Y, F/Y, H/Y, C, I, R3m AIC: 7, HQ: 2, BIC: 1 3 1966–2015
Note: Subscripts nc, df and r stand respectively for “no-crisis” for “alternative deflator” and for “debt measured as
a ratio to GDP.” The acronyms AIC, HQ, BIC represent the standard information criteria: the adopted one has been
written in bold character.
includes GDP, total public debt, total credit to private (nonfinancial) sector, and
the three-month T-Bill interest rate. We then augment the benchmark model,
considering private consumption, firm investment, disaggregating private debt in
corporate business and mortgage debt series. All the estimated model specifications
are reported in Table 3, together with the reference period (1966–2015 in the
benchmark specification), the lag number p suggested by standard information
criteria,8 and the tested number r of cointegration relations.
Before discussing the results derived from the identification of the structural
model, we show in Table 4 the estimated cointegration relations. Indeed, as dis-
cussed in Johansen and Juselius (1994), the long-run parameters β is the same both
in the reduced and structural forms, implying that the identification of the coin-
tegration relations can be performed already in the reduced form.9 Table 4 shows
positive bivariate long-run relationships between GDP and each of the debt series.
In what follows, we first describe the results derived from the benchmark
structural model (cf. Section 4.1). We then present in Section 4.2 the results of
the model augmented with the consumption or investment series. In Section 4.3,
we report the findings obtained employing disaggregated private debt series, also
studying the crowding-out vis-a`-vis crowding-in effects of public debt shocks on
private consumption and investment.
4.1. Baseline Model
The baseline regression we consider here is a four-dimensional CVAR con-
taining output, government debt, private debt, ant the 3-months T-Bill interest
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TABLE 4. Estimated cointegration relations (βt )
Variable ID 1 ID 2 (r = 2) ID 3 (r = 2) ID 4 (r = 2) ID 5
Y 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
B −0.0052 0 1 0 1 0 1 −0.1763
L −0.7092 −3.3690 −21.2617 −0.5813 −22.9709
F −0.3506 −2.1589
H −0.3714
I 3.6784 27.6748 −0.4433 1.7958
C −0.1832 29.1448 −0.1634
R −1.2553 −10.7382 −71.2981 −1.1836 −25.0376 0.3161 2.6357 −1.8142
const. −5.7968 1.0895 54.1615 −4.8187 −151.8507 −7.4530 −0.1093 −5.5472
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rate (cf. Table 3). The latter variable controls also for possible monetary-policy
effects.
Figure 3 shows the causal matrices of the structural CVAR model, identified
with the ICA data-driven causal search procedure. The first matrix on the left (lag
0) represents B = I − 0. The “agnostic” selection identification strategy for the
Cholesky decomposition suggests a contemporaneous causal structure in which
only private debt has a positive effect on GDP. The other two variables does not
seem to have any contemporaneous impact.
Let us now consider the impact of public and private debts on GDP dynamics.
The estimated IRFs are depicted in Figure 4.10 We find that a positive shock to
public debt persistently and positively spurs output growth. Such a result con-
tributes to the debate on the positive or negative effect of public debt on GDP
growth with a fresh piece of evidence obtained with a data-driven identification
methodology in a cointegrated VAR framework. In that, it should be immune
of possible theoretical choices and biases. In line with the evidence discussed
in the introduction [see Jorda et al. (2013)], private debt shocks increase GDP
in the short-run, but have negligible effects on output at longer horizons (cf.
Figure 4).
4.2. Augmented Models
Let us now augment the baseline model (cf. Table 3) by adding either aggregate
investment (model 2) or private consumption (model 3). The richer specifications
could shed further light on the possible transmission mechanisms of private and
public debt.
Figure 5 represents the matrices of the structural VARs for the models 2 (top
row) and 3 (bottom row). The change of variables between the two models leads
to quite different contemporaneous causal structures, which our identification
strategy is flexible enough to capture. In model 2, GDP pushes private debt and
private investment, suggesting the possible presence of an accelerator mechanism
(see Figure 5). The positive effect of private debt on investment highlights the link
between the financial structure of firms and households and their real decisions
about investment. In model 3, instead, the unique significant contemporaneous
causal effect is played by consumption on output, which is in line with the co-
movements found by Stock and Watson (1999) in the United States at the business
cycle frequencies. While the differences in the observed causal structures of the
three models could be possibly be due to the different variables included in the
cointegrated SVARs, the causal matrices at lags one and two are pretty similar and
consistent also with the ones of the baseline specification (cf. Figure 5).
The IRFs (Figure 6) reinforce the results obtained in the benchmark specifi-
cation. In line with the IRF of model 1, public debt shocks still do cause higher
output. On the contrary, private debt shocks have a positive and milder impact in
the short-run, but negative effects in the medium-run. In order to further investigate
such results, in the next section, we consider disaggregated private debt series.
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FIGURE 3. SVAR causal matrices up to the 2nd lag for the baseline model 1. The variables below the matrices cause the ones on the left.
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FIGURE 4. Impulse response functions, model 1. Response of GDP to a 1% standard devi-
ation shock to public debt (upper panel) and to private debt (lower panel). 95% confidence
bands obtained via bootstrap.
4.3. Disaggregated Models
We decompose the total private debt into its two main components: mortgage and
corporate debts. This allows us to address the possible issue of having selected a
bad proxy for aggregate private debt [even if it has been extensively used in the
literature, see, e.g., Jorda et al. (2014)]. Moreover, such a decomposition allows us
to better understand how debt to different microeconomic actors (i.e., households
and firms) can impact differently on output dynamics.
The new CVAR specifications adds to GDP, public debt and the 3-month T-Bill
interest rate either corporate business debt and investment or mortgage debt and
private consumption (cf. models 4 and 5 in Table 3). The causal SVAR matrices
for the scenario with disaggregated private debt series are presented in Figure 7.
The causal structure of the two models is very similar to the one of models 2 and
3 (cf. Figure 5), suggesting that the dynamics of disaggregated private debt series
is akin to the one of private debt. Moreover, lagged effects are consistent with all
the previous regressions, thus further confirming that the “simple” baseline model
is able to capture the lag structure.
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FIGURE 5. SVAR causal matrices up to the second lag for the augmented models 2 (top panels) and 3 (bottom panels). The variables below the
matrices cause the ones on the left.
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panels) and to private debt (lower panels). 95% confidence bands obtained via bootstrap.
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FIGURE 7. SVAR causal matrices up to the second lag for the disaggregated models 4 (top panels) and 5 (bottom panels). The variables below the
matrices cause the ones on the left.
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The impact of public, corporate, and mortgages debt shocks are reported in
the IRFs in Figure 8. In line with our previous results, the effects of public debt
shocks remain positive both in the short- and in the medium-run. The IRFs of
mortgage and corporate debt provide a better understanding of the origin of the
long-term negative effects of private debt. Indeed, we find that while corporate debt
(left panel) has positive effects on GDP dynamics similar to those of public debt,
mortgage debt shows strong negative effects in the medium-run (cf. Figure 8).11
Mortgage debt appears to be the main driver of aggregate private debt dynamics.
The negative effects of mortgage credit may be due to its inflating impact on real
asset prices, which possibly contribute to the emergence of bubbles [see Jorda et al.
(2016)]. The positive effect of corporate debt on investment shows the positive
link between credit and firms’ real decisions.
We now consider the reaction of private consumption and investment as to public
and private debt shocks. In that, we also study the crowding-out or crowding-in ef-
fects of public expenditure and public debt. The textbook crowding-out hypothesis
suggest a competing role between government and private expenditures: higher
public consumption simply replaces private one or investment, even if government
runs deficit and increases its debt [see Barro (1974, 1989)]. On the contrary, the
crowding-in hypothesis implies that government deficit not only does not “steal”
any opportunity for the private sector, but it also spurs consumption and investment
via higher aggregate demand [Woodford (1990), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998),
Stiglitz (2012)].
The IRFs in Figure 9 show the effects of public and private disaggregated
debt shocks on aggregate private consumption and investment. Similarly to what
happens to GDP, the IRFs suggest that public debt shocks have positive and
persistent effects on both consumption and investment. Corporate debt also bear
positive effects on investment. Such results provide fresh new evidence supporting
the crowding-in hypothesis. Instead, household debt boosts consumption only in
the very short run, while the effects turn negative in the medium run, supporting
once again the evidence showed above. Such a result might also be partially
due to the increased ratio between adjustable-rate mortgages and fixed-rate ones
that has occurred in the United States between 2000 and 2007 [see Furlong and
Takhtamanova (2012)].12
5. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
In this section, we test the robustness of the results vis-a`-vis the time period
considered for the econometric analysis and for alternative specifications of the
structural CVAR model.
Let us begin by assessing how the inclusion of the Great Recession in our
sample period has affected the econometric results of the models. More specially,
we jettison the post-2008 observations, and we estimate the model for the period
from 1966 (Q1) to 2008 (Q3). The causal matrices in Figure 10 show that the
relations entailed in the full-sample models robustly hold and there are only mild
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FIGURE 8. Impulse response functions, models 4 (left) and 5 (right). Response of GDP to a 1% standard deviation shock to public debt (upper
panels), to corporate debt (lower left panel), and to mortgage debt (lower right panel). 95% confidence bands obtained via bootstrap.
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deviation shock to public debt (upper panels), to corporate debt (lower left panel), and to mortgage debt (lower right panel). 95% confidence bands
obtained via bootstrap.
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FIGURE 10. SVAR causal matrices up to the second lag for the baseline model 1 estimated in the period 1966–2008. The variables below the
matrices cause the ones on the left.
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FIGURE 11. Impulse response functions, models 1nc. Response of GDP to a 1% standard de-
viation shock to public debt (upper panel) and to private debt (lower panel). 95% confidence
bands obtained via bootstrap.
changes in the magnitudes of the effects. Moreover, the IRFs (cf. Figure 11)
confirm the results obtained employing the whole sample: public debts shocks
still spur output growth. The unique difference is that the IRF of private debt
shifts up, suggesting that the Great Recession has reduced the (positive) impact of
private debt on GDP dynamics.
We then check the robustness of the results with respect to alternative model
specifications. First, we consider alternative deflators. In all the setting presented
in Section 4, real consumption and investment has been obtained employing the
GDP-deflator. When we adopt the consumption and investment deflators (models
2df and 3df in Table 3), the IRF results do not substantially change (see Figure 12).13
Moreover, in model 6 (see Table 3), we replace the 3-months T-Bill interest rate
with the 10-years one (cf. Table 1), as households and firms might take their
decision according to long-term interest rates. Results in Figure 13 (left panel)
are consistent with the previously presented evidence. Finally, in model 7, we
augment the baseline specification adding government expenditure, to control for
the main source of public debt and to possibly account for the magnitude of the
fiscal multiplier. The results showed by the IRFs in Figure 13 (right panel) are
consistent with the previously presented evidence. In particular, public expenditure
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FIGURE 12. Impulse response functions, models 2df (left) and 3df (right). Response of GDP to a 1% standard deviation shock to public debt (upper
panels) and to private debt (lower panels). 95% confidence bands obtained via bootstrap.
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FIGURE 13. Impulse response functions, models 6 (left) and 7 (right). Response of GDP to a 1% standard deviation shock to public debt (upper
panels) and to private debt (lower panels). 95% confidence bands obtained via bootstrap.
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FIGURE 14. Impulse response functions, models 7. Response of GDP to a 1% standard
deviation shock to public expenditure. 95% confidence bands obtained via bootstrap.
shocks have a positive impact on GDP (see Figure 14), suggesting a Keynesian
transmission mechanisms for the positive effects of public debt.14
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the effects of public and private debt shocks on
GDP dynamic employing a battery of cointegrated VAR models, which have
been identified employing the novel data-driven ICA in order to obtain structural
models purged of ad-hoc theoretical restrictions.
The analysis of the ensuing IRFs shows that public debt shocks positively and
persistently affect GDP dynamics. In particular, we find that public debt shocks
crowd-in private consumption and investment expenditure. We thus provide a
fresh new piece of evidence to the debate on the role of public debt on growth [see
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Cecchetti et al. (2011), Minea and Parent (2012),
Herndon et al. (2013), Egert (2015)]. Moreover, such a result appears to be ro-
bust to different model specifications and to the inclusion/exclusion of the Great
Recession in the time sample.
At the same time, the effects of private debt are positive but milder, and they
die out in the medium-run. In addition, in line with recent growing literature [see
Mian and Sufi (2009), Jorda et al. (2013), Batini et al. (2016)], we find a strong
negative association between household mortgage debt and private consumption
and GDP in the medium-run. This result corroborates the hints from the financial
frictions literature [see, e.g., Brunnermeier et al. (2013)] suggesting that financial
and real crises are generated by real asset bubbles interplaying with fast mortgage
debt expansions.
The coexistence of positive effects of public debt with negative ones stemming
from household debt points to the Janus-faced impact of debt on economic activity.
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Our work could be extended in at least two ways. First, we could account
for possible existing nonlinearities between public debt and GDP dynamics em-
ploying Threshold Vector Auto-Regression models [as in Proan˜o et al. (2014),
Ferraresi et al. (2015)]. Moreover, our analysis could be extended to other devel-
oped economies to search for possible heterogeneous effects of public and private
debt and the dynamics of the economy.
NOTES
1. More generally, Ng and Wright (2013) found that in the last 30 years all US recessions have
financial origins.
2. See the survey by Panizza and Presbitero (2013) for a more detailed discussion.
3. In particular, estimating a pooled model suggests the presence of an inversely U-shaped curve,
but when country heterogeneity is accounted for, the curve becomes U-shaped for most of the countries
[see Figure 2 in Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015)].
4. This identification strategy builds on the previous works by Swanson and Granger (1997), Bessler
and Lee (2002), Demiralp and Hoover (2003), and Moneta (2008). Recently, Bayesian strategies have
also been used to tackle the same issue [see Ahelegbey et al. (2016)].
5. For more details about Independent Component Analysis, its assumptions, algorithms, and
related concepts see Hyvarinen et al. (2005) and references therein.
6. The differential entropy H of a random vector x with probability density f (x) is defined as
H(x) = − ∫ f (x) log f (x)dx.
7. It also turns out that the independent components ε1t , . . . , εkt can be estimated by minimizing
mutual information or, equivalently, by finding linear combinations of the data in which negentropy,
a measure of non-Gaussianity, is maximized. Negentropy J of a random vector x with differential
entropy H(x) is defined as J (x) = H(xgauss) − H(x), where xgauss is a Gaussian random variable of
the same covariance matrix as x.
8. The bold in the lag selection corresponds to our choice. Where possible, we have adopted the
Bayes–Schwartz Criterion (BIC). In the cases, in which the adoption of such a criterion was a poor
one (because residuals displayed some correlation structure), we have selected the more parsimonious
between the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Hannan–Quinn Criterion (HQ). All the
cointegration relations are estimated with a constant trend.
9. Note that discrepancies between cointegration relations and impulse-response functions are in
principle possible, since cointegration suggests a comovement or mutual attraction among a set of
variables, while an IRF provides the effect (over time) of an exogenous intervention on a single
variable on another variable.
10. The IRFs are robust to different model estimation strategy, such as the level-VAR estimated with
OLS. The represented confidence intervals are calculated via bootstrapping for the 5% and at the 95%
levels. Note that the fact that the IRFs do not necessarily converge to zero level is due to the fact that
we estimate the model in level, which is consistent with the Johansen (1995) procedure.
11. The negative long-run response of GDP to household debt shocks might be considered in contrast
with the positive cointegrating relationship between the two variables. However, the equivalence
between cointegrating relationship and causality among a set of variable is problematic, as it does
not suggest a causal direction. This is why one should refer to the results produced by structural
models.
12. Adjustable-rate mortgages are indeed characterized by a low and fixed interest rate for the first
2 or 3 years (and indeed up to the 12th lag the household debt has a positive effect on consumption).
Then, the interest rate is adjusted by the bank (typically upward), possibly causing a negative effect on
consumption.
13. Also, the results related to the causal structures, which are available from the authors upon
request, are fully compatible with the ones presented in models 2 and 3.
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14. We also estimate models where we consider the ratio of public and private debt over GDP
and richer specification encompassing GDP, public debt, firm debt, mortgage debt, consumption,
investment, and the 3-month T-Bill interest rate. Our results hold also in such models (the related IRFs
are available from the authors upon request.)
15. Results and graphs for the other models are available from the authors upon request.
16. Notice here that the rejection of H0 stands for non-Gaussianity.
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APPENDIX A: THE VARLINGAM ALGORITHM
(1) Estimate the reduced form VAR model of equation (2) obtaining estimates ˆAi of the
matrices Ai, ∀ i = 1, . . . , p. Denote by ˆU the K × T matrix of the corresponding
estimated VAR error terms, that is each column of ˆU is uˆt ≡ (uˆ1t , . . . , uˆKt )′, ∀ t =
1, . . . , T . Check whether the uit (for all rows i) indeed are non-Gaussian, and proceed
only if this is so.
(2) Use FastICA or any other suitable ICA algorithm [Hyvarinen et al. (2005)] to obtain a
decomposition ˆU = PE, where P is K × K and E is K × T , such that the rows of E
are the estimated independent components of ˆU. Then, validate non-Gaussianity and
(at least approximate) statistical independence of the components before proceeding.
(3) Let ˜˜0 = P−1. Find ˜0, the row-permutated version of ˜˜0, which minimizes
∑
i
1
| ˜0,ii|
with respect to the permutation. Note that this is a linear matching problem, which can
be easily solved even for high K [Shimizu et al. (2006)].
(4) Divide each row of ˜0 by its diagonal element, to obtain a matrix ˆ0 with all ones on
the diagonal.
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(5) Let ˜B = I − ˆ0.
(6) Find the permutation matrix Z, which makes Z ˜BZT as close as possible to lower
triangular. This can be formalized as minimizing the sum of squares of the permuted
upper-triangular elements, and minimized using a heuristic procedure [Shimizu et al.
(2006)]. Set the upper-triangular elements to zero, and permute back to obtain ˆB, which
now contains the acyclic contemporaneous structure. (Note that it is useful to check
that Z ˜BZT indeed is close to strictly lower-triangular.)
(7) ˆB now contains K(K − 1)/2 nonzero elements, some of which may be very small
(and statistically insignificant). For improved interpretation and visualization, it may
be desired to prune out (set to zero) small elements at this stage, for instance using a
bootstrap approach [Shimizu et al. (2006)].
(8) Finally, calculate estimates of i, ∀ i = 1, . . . , p for lagged effects using i = (I −
ˆB) ˆAi.
APPENDIX B: TESTING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF
THE ICA ALGORITHM
At the base of our causal search algorithm stand two important assumptions:
• A1: the residuals are linear combinations of underlying components that are mutually
independent;
• A2: the residuals are linear combinations of underlying components that are non-
Gaussian (with at most one of them Gaussian).
But, the second assumption might also be relaxed and replaced by its milder version:
• A2 bis: the residuals are linear combinations of underlying components that are
jointly non-Gaussian.
The typical assumption required for SVAR is orthogonality—, i.e., absence of depen-
dencies in the first moment—which is testable. Our causal search strategy instead requires
independence—, i.e., absence of dependencies in all the moments—that instead cannot be
tested. Testing for the absence of correlation at least, allows us to obtain a first indication for
the fact that, the assumption is not rejected (up to the first order). We test this via a bivariate
graphical inspection and via simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The results
in Figure 15 are presented only for the first model for the sake of brevity, but for all the
models presented in Table 3 the results are very similar, indicating that the structural shocks
do not present clear patterns and that we cannot reject the independence assumption.15
Also, a statistical analysis by means of OLS suggest that this is the case. In fact by
running simple linear regressions of the type:
εi = βεj
where i and j stand for the residuals of two different variables, allows one again to check
whether some linear relations between the structural residuals εi and εj exists. Table 5
presents the results for the first baseline model. For the others models, the results are very
similar and allow us to conclude that in this case the independence of the structural shocks
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FIGURE 15. Independence test on the structural residuals of the baseline models 1.
TABLE 5. OLS regressions allowing to check for independence of the structural
shocks
Equation Coefficient Standard error t statistic p-value
Y = f(B) −0.08658981 0.04535515 −1.9091505 0.05774169
Y = f(L) −0.04699905 0.08438565 −0.5569554 0.57820994
Y = f(R) 0.15871436 0.06997094 2.2682896 0.02443041
Y = f(B,L) −0.08485211 0.04570988 −1.8563190 0.06495647−0.03061003 0.08431399 −0.3630480 0.71697261
Y = f(B,R) −0.07105341 0.04569677 −1.5548891 0.121636600.13977211 0.07076914 1.9750431 0.04971154
Y = f(L,R) −0.06442700 0.08376427 −0.7691466 0.442761330.16355376 0.07032789 2.3255889 0.02109609
Y = f(B,L,R)
−0.06774527 0.04612290 −1.4687989 0.14354977
−0.04929656 0.08414325 −0.5858647 0.55866539
0.14435692 0.07132240 2.0240053 0.04437743
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100518000445
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SciencesPo Inst dEtudes Politiques Paris, on 22 Jan 2019 at 17:00:20, subject to the
THE JANUS-FACED NATURE OF DEBT 31
TABLE 6. Shapiro–Wilk test for non-Gaussianity p-values
Variable ID 1 ID 2 ID 3 ID 4 ID 5
joint 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
uY 0.001 0.001 0.062 0.004 0.100
uB 0.028 0.024 0.014 0.540 0.001
uL 0.879 0.113 0.378
uF 0.062
uH 0.295
uI 0.941 0.072
uC 0.030 0.107
uR3m 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: H0 = Gaussianity.
is an assumption which is satisfied. Indeed only a few times some parameters result slightly
significant at the 5%, while they never are at the 1%, indicating that their independence
might be a not too much restrictive assumption in this case.
The second assumption is instead more easily testable, and we do that via Shapiro–Wilk
test for normality on the residuals. The (reduced form) residuals are linear combinations of
the underlying components (the structural shocks) and since a linear combination of Gaus-
sian components would necessarily imply Gaussian residuals as well, if the residuals are
non-Gaussian, they must have been generated by non-Gaussian components.16 In Table 6,
we check that the assumption A2 or that at least its milder version, A2 bis is satisfied. From
the first row, it is easy to see that at least the assumption A2 bis is always satisfied. After a
more detailed check, we see that the strict version is satisfied in three out of five cases (the
models with ID 1, 2, and 4). We therefore conclude that the conditions are met and the ICA
algorithm is here applicable quite safely.
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